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Fln ndal  Podby  and Sytems 
Fmancial liberalization was carried out in a  An analysis of finn-level data reveals that
period when the nonfimancial  corporate sector  nonfinancial corpor ions  were subject to both
was in financial distress due to reduced profita-  an earnings shock (increases in costs relative to
bility.  The consequent emergence of substantial  sales income) and an interest rate shock.  Al-
nonperfonming  lo-is  in the banking sector,  though the debt-to-asset ratios cf profitable
especially among smaller banks, created fierce  firms did not change, those of firms under
competition for financial resources. The result  distress actually increased, despite higher costs
was a rapid expansion of deposits and high real  of borrowing.
interest rates.  Instead of forcing insolvent bor-
rowers into bankniptcy, banks refinanced  The Turkish experience suggests that
nonperforming loans as a way to prolong their  financial liberalization may not produce desired
own survival, and real credit to the private sector  results when it occurs in a period of major
increased dramatically.  Furthermore, the market  macroeconomic realignments that adversely
mechanism turned out to be il-equipped to  affect the profitability of the corporate sector,
induce the exit of insolvent banks and thereby  especially when it is implemented without an
increase the efiTciency  of allocating loanable  adequate regulatory framework.
funds.
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In  mid  1980,  economic  policy  makers  in  Turkey  initiated  attempts  to
restructure  and  deregulate  the  financial  sector. The  main  steps  taken  were
the  removal  of legal  restrictions  on interest  rates  and the  allowance  and
encouragement  of financial  transactions  through  new  types  of financial
institutions  and  instruments.  An important  aspect  of the  deregulation
attempts  was that  they  were  implemented  simultaneously  with  and,  indeed,  as
part  of,  a comprehensive  stabilization/liberalization  program.
Among  the  most important  objectives  of financial  liberalization  the
following  were  mentioned  by policy  makers:
- Deregulation  was expected  to increase  interest  rates  -which  were  hitherto
negative  in real  terms-,  and  therefore  increase  financial  savings  and  deposits
in the  banking  sector,  as  well  as introduce  competition  into  the  banking
system,  although,  as  will  be seen  below,  the  nature  of the  competition  that
was desired  was ambiguous. It  seems  more  plausible  to  assume  that  policy
makers  interpreted  competition  as elimination  of direct  government  controls
rather  than  non-collusive  behavior  on the  part  of banks.
- It  was  hoped  that  an increase  in interest  rates  would  push  corporations  in
the  private  sector,  which  were  typically  highly  leveraged,  to  reduce  their
indebtedness  and  increase  their  equity  base.  Owners  of firms  were  advised  to
liquidate  personal  wealth  and  transfer  it to  their  firms  as equity  capital.
"Sell  your  villas  to finance  your  corporations"  was the  call  oE the  day. The
increase  in  the  interest  rates  was  expected  to allocate  loanable  funds  to  most
profitable  users.
- Bankruptcy  was  believed  to  be a  major  regulatory  force  in the  corporate
sector.  Inefficient  firms,  especially  those  in  previously  protected  import
competing  sectors,  were  expected  either  to adjust  to the  requirements  of the-2-
new  economic  policies,  for  example,  by  vegrina  production  towards  exports,  or
to leave  the  market.
On the  macroeconomic  side,  the  most  important  developments  in  1980-82
were  export  orientation  and  disinflation.'  The  comprehensive
stabilization/liberalization  program  included  policies  aimed  at trade
liberalization,  real  depreciation  of the  exchange  rate  and  reduction  of
domestic  absorption.  The  economy  responded  quickly. The  Gross  National
Product  (GNP)  growth  rate,  which  was  negative  in 1979  and  1980  picked  up and
reached  4.1%  in 1981  and  4.6%  in 1982;  although  below  the  1973-77  average  of
6.5%,  the  increase  in  growth  rates  did  reflect  a recovery. In  the  meantime,
the  composition  of demand  changed  drastically:  The  rate  of  growth  of  domestic
absorption,  averaging  8.2%  in  1973-77,  was  only  1.6  and  2.8%  in  1981  and  1982.
While  the  contribution  of foreign  balance  to  GNP  growth  was  negative  between
1973-77,  it  was  positive  in the  1980's--with  the  exception  of 1983.2 Exports
grew  by 47 and  25%  in  constant  Turkish  lira  prices  in 1981  and  1982
respectively.  The  decline  in the  rate  of inflation  was  even  more  dramatic.
The  annual  rate  of change  of the  wholesale  price  index  declined  from  around
107%  in  1980  to 37%  in 1981  and  25%  in 1982  (see  Figure  1).  In short,  1980-82
were  years  of  drastic  realignments  in  major  macroeconomic  variables,  which
were  bound  to affect  corporate  performance.
The  deregulation  episode  in the  financial  markerc  lasted  two  and  a  half
years. The  objective  of increasing  deposits  and  financial  savings  in general
1  For  a  detailed  overview  of  macroeconomic  policies  and  performance  in  the
1970s  and  1980s,  see  Celasun  and  Rodrik  (1987).
2  Data  from  OECD,  Economic  Survey:  Turkey,  various  issues. Let  Y,  A and  B
stand  for  GNP,  domestic  absorption  and  the  current  account  surplus
respectively,  all in constant  prices.  Then, Y - A + B and Y - aA + bB where
hats  denote  percentage  changes,  a - A/Y and  bA-  B/Y.  The  contribution  of
foreign  balance  to GNP  growth  is  defined  as bB.-3-
was  met  with  considerable  success. However,  a financial  crisis  broke  out  in
1982  and  several  brokerage  houses  went  bankrupt. In 1983,  the  Central  Bank
took  over  the  administration  of some  "problem"  banks,  put  all  the  others  uneer
close  supervision,  and  started  to  reregulate  deposit  interest  rates. Overall,
it  can  safely  be said  that  the  response  of the  financial  sector  to
deregulation  was  worse  than  expected.
The  objective  of this  paper  is  to  present  an overview  of the  events  that
culminated  in the  crisis. This  will  be done  in two  steps. First  (Section  2)
the  events  in the  banking  sector  will  be summarized.  In  the  banking  sector,
shocks  to  the  corporate  sector  made  portions  of  banks'  assets  nonperforming.
This  was  true  especially  for  some  smaller  banks. Rather  than  forcing
liquidation  of their  clients,  these  banks  engaged  in  a fierce  competition  to
collect  funds,  to  raise  resources  both  to  meet  their  liabilities  and  to
refinance  non-performing  loans. Interest  rates  soared. Some  banks  were  thus
able  to  survive  even  though  they  were  insolvent,  until  the  government  finally
intervened.
To get  some  clues  about  why  bank  loans  might  have  become  non-performing,
Section  3  looks  at  the  private  corporate  sector.  Analysis  of  a  panel  data  set
of  corporations  reveals  that  in  this  period  firms  were  subject  not  only  to  an
interest  rate  shock,  but also  to  a gross  earnings  shock  (increase  in  costs
relative  to  sales  income). While  one  would  expect  that  higher  interest  rates
on loans  would  make  firms  reduce  their  indebtedness,  debt  to assets  ratios  of
profitable  firms  did  not  change  much  during  1980-82,  and  those  of firms  under
distress  actually  increased.
These  observations  suggest  that  financial  liberalization  may  not  generate
desired  responses  if it  is  carried  out  when  there  are  major  changes  in  the-4-
macroeconomic  environment  that  adversely  affect  the  profitability  of and  cause
financial  distress  in  the  corporate,  and  consequently,  banking  sectors.
Furthermore,  the  market  mechanism  did  not  seem  to  be well  equipped  to carry
out  its  most  essential  regulatory  function  in  an efficient  manner,  that  is,
inducing  the  exit  of insolvent  economic  units  and  thereby  decreasing
inefficiency  in the  allocation  of loanable  funds.
Section  4 will  conclude  the  paper.
2 - DEVELOPMENTS  IN  THE  BANKING  SECTOR
There  were two  principal  sets  of  players  in the  financial  crisis  of 1982.
On the  one  hand  were  the  banks. The  Turkish  financial  system  has  been
dominated  by commercial  banks. At the  end  of 1979,  the  commercial  banking
system  was  composed  of 12 state  owned  banks,  24  private  banks  and  4 foreign
banks. The  market  was  highly  concentrated.  The  share  of the  largest  4  banks
(one  state  owned  and  three  private)  in  total  assets  was  58%  and  56%  in total
deposits. Each  of 11  smallest  private  banks  held  less  than  1%  of the  total
assets  of the  banking  system.
Most  private  banks  were  owned  or controlled  by industrial
conglomerates. 3 This  pattern  of  ownership  was the  result  of two  trends:  Some
of the  private  banks  were actually  established  by industrial  groups  controlled
by individual  families,  while  smaller  and  provin-cial  banks  were  established  by
local  businessmen  and  later  acquired  by industrial  groups  and  transformed  into
nation-wide  banks. New  entry  into  the  banking  system  was subject  to the
permission  of the  government.  Prior  to  deregulation,  the  governments  had  been
very  conservative  in granting  the  necessary  permission.  As a result,  the
3One  important  exception  is  Turkiye  Is  Bankasi,  the  largest  private  bank in
Turkey.-5-
number  of banks  had  been  stable  between  38-42  in the  1970's.
Prior  to  deregulation,  interest  rates  on  both  deposits  and  credits  were
fixed  by the  government  at  low  levels. vlith  accelerating  inflation  in the
1970's,  real  interest  rates  on depcsits  were largely  negative  (see  Figure  1).
Another  set  of  players  that  proved  especially  important  in the  events
after  the  deregulation  were  the  brokerage  houses. Most  brokerage  houses  were
establishsd  around  the  year  1979,  when  industrial  corporations  started  to
issue  bonds.4 Some  "bankless"  industrial  groups,  unable  to enter  the  banking
business,  formed  their  own  brokerage  houses. 5 The  rapid  development  of the--
admittedly  small--bond  market  also  encouraged  the  establishment  of independent
brokerage  houses. 6
Deregulation  in the  banking  sector  was started  by two  important  steps
undertaken  in  July,  1980,  whereby:  a)  Legal  restrictions  on deposit  and  loan
interest  rates  were removed,  and,  b) banks  were  allowed  to issue  negotiable
certificates  of deposit  (CDs). 7 Following  Artun  (1983),  the  events  that
followed  these  deregulatory  steps  and  culminated  in  the  financial  crisis  of
1982  can  be summarized  in  two  stages: 8
4Artun  (1983,  pp.  70,  77)  argues  that  bond issues  resulted  from  new financing
requirements  due  to the  impact  of devaluations  of 1978-79  on corporations.
5  Examples  are  Meban  of  Transturk  Holding,  Eczacibasi  Yatirim  of Eczacibasi
Holding  and  Oyak  Yatirim  of  Oyak  Holding.
6  One  has  to  make  a distinction  between  the  brokerage  houses  discussed  in the
text,  which  traded,  at least  in the  initial  stages  of the  process,  in
securities  of industrial  firms  and  banks,  and,  other  unorganized  money  market
institutions  that  collected  funds  solely  against  Rersonal  cheques  and  IOUs.
The latter  type  of institutions  (dubbed  "market  bankers"  in  Turkey)  mushroomed
following  the  deregulation  and  were the  actors  of  another  crisis  that  unfolded
at the  end  of 1981. These  institutions  and  their  evolution  will  not  be
addressed  in this  study.
7  For  a  more  comprehensive  overview  of financial  reform,  see  Akyuz  (1988).
8  The  following  summary  is  primarily  based  on accounts  given  in  Colasan  (1983,
1984a,  1984b),  Ulagay  (1987),  and  Artun  (1983,  1985).-6-
Stale  1. the  Initial  Months' Soon  after  the  reform  program  was
announced,  larger  banks  encouraged  members  of  the  banking  system  to  form  a
cartel  and  set  deposit  interest  rates  collusively,  at  a rate  higher  than  the
pre-liberalization  level  (30%  on annual  deposits).  The  monetary  authorities
did  not  seem  to  object  to  collusion,  although  they  did  think  that  the  interest
rate  was  low,  given  that  the  inflation  rate  exceeded  100%  in 1980  (See  figure
U.9'10 In  any  case,  the  so-called  gentlemen's  agreement  that  was  drawn
between  the  banks  was  not  adhered  to;  some  (mostly  smaller)  banks  offered
higher  deposit  rates. Initially,  it seems  that  the  breakdown  of the  cartel
agreement  was  due  to an  attempt  by smaller  banks  to  explc.lt  their  competitive
edges,  which  arose  from  their  lower  intermediation  costs. By the  end  of 1980,
these  banks  offered  deposit  interest  rates  that  were  2-5  percentage  points
higher  than  the  30%  envisaged  in the  agreement. In  February  1981,  a  new
gentlemen's  agreement  was  signed,  whereby  the  rate  of interest  on one  year
deposits  was raised  to 50%. Soon,  this  agreement  was  also  broken  by some
banks.
Besides  the  deposit  interest  rate,  CDs  also  proved  to  be an important
tool  of competition  and  were  widely  used. A substantial  proportion  of CDs
were  marketed  through  brokerage  houses,  both  through  those  that  were
independent  and  those  that  were subsidiaries  of  banks  or  holding  companies.  A
mechanism  was  developed  whereby  banks  in  effect  used  CDs  and  brokers  to
circumvent  the  gentlemen's  agreements  and  t:Aed  to increase  their  share  in  the
market  for  deposits: CDs  were  issued  to  brokerage  houses  in large  volumes  at
°  As indicated  in the  introduction,  however,  the  rate  of inflation  declined  to
25%  in  1982.
10 For  the  period  1980-82,  interest  rates  shown  in  the  figure  correspond  to
chose  declared  in  gentlemen's  agreements.  As discussed  in  the  text  below,
actual  deposit  rates  were  higher.-7-
a  discount.  The  brokers  would  resell  the  CDs to  the  public  at  par;  sometimes
they  would  increase  the  effective  interest  rate  by  attaching  to  the  CDs
parallel  interest  bearing  promissory  notes,  thereby  making  the  CDs more
attractive  for  depositors.  The  fact  that  the  CDs originated  in  banks  seems
to  have  provided  buyers  of  CDs a  guarantee  of  their  safety.  The  difference
between  the  broker's  buying  and  effective  selling  prices  were  generally  lent
to  marginal  businesses  at  high  interest  rates. 11
Stage  2.  Change  in  the  Environment:  By  mid-  to  late-1981,  the  driving
force  behind  inter-bank  competition  changed.  Due  to  the  poor  earnings
performance  of  the  corporate  sector,  non-performing  loans  became  a  major
problem.  While  meetings  between  banks  continued  and  resulted  in  new
gentlemen's  agreements,  especially  smaller  banks  started  to  attract  new
deposits  by  increasing  their  interest  rates  to  basically  solve  cash-flow
problems  created  by  non-performing  loans,  both  to  refinance  the  latter  and
also  to  meet  their  obligations  to  their  claimants.  In  the  ensuing  price  war
for  deposits  some  banks  were  known  to  offer  as  high  as  65%  on  1  year  deposits,
when  the  rate  of  inflation  was  30-35%.  Furthermore,  two  of  the  largest  banks
that  previously  avoided  competition  soon  ended  up  joining  the  price  war
(Artun,  1985,  p.55).  High  cost  of  funds  increased  the  cost  of  credit
dramatically  (see  Table  1  and  the  discussion  below).
Sales  of  large  amounts  of  CDs also  continued.  Some banks  formed  their
own  subsidiary  brokerage  houses  to  take  advantage  of  the  mechanism  discussed
above.12  Issuing  CDs through  brokerage  houses  was  not  restricted  to  private
11 Corporate  bond  issntes  were  limited  by  capital  adequacy  requirements.
According  to  Artun  (1983,  p.70)  and  Colasan  (1984b,  p.73)  these  requirements
became  binding  in  1981  for  major  bond  issuers  and  the  resulting  reduction  in
new  supply  of  securities  was  one  of  the  reasons  that  drove  brokerage  houses
into  the  CD business.
12  For  example,  Istanbul  Bankasi,  Hisarbank  and  Bagbank  established  Fintas.
Eko-Yatirim  and  and  Fiban,  respectively.  All  three  of  these  banks  were-8-
banks  and  at least  two  state  owned  banks  (Vakiflar  Bankasi  and  Anadolu
Bankasi)  participated  ln the  practice. Realizing  that  things  were  getting  out
of  hand,  in  November  1981  monetary  authorities  prohibited  banks  from  marketing
CDs  through  brokers. However,  it  was common  knowledge  among  market
participants  that  some  banks  went  on  with the  practice. One  of the  brokerage
houses  that  continued  to  market  CDs  after  the  ban  was  Banker  Kastelli.
Banker  Kastelli  was the  largest  brokerage  house  in the  market. The
institution  was  mainly  marketing  bonds  of  private  sector  companies  unti' -he
end  of  1980.  Finding  it  more  and  more  difficult  to  maintain  a steady  l.y
of securities,  Kastelli  joined  the  CD  business  in  early  1981. The  evolution
of  Kastelli's  business  is  a good  example  of financial  behavior  under  distress:
In the  early  stages  the  broker was  able  to  exercise  caution  in  choosing  its
client  banks  and  avoided  marketing  the  CDs  of risky  banks. By 1982--after  the
ban  on issuing  CDs  through  bankers--illiquidity  problems  pushed  Kastelli  to
market  the  CDs  of those  risky  banks  that  the  banker  had  earlier  tried  to
avoid.1 3 Furthermore,  the  owner  of  Banker  Kastelli,  Cevher  Ozden,  started  to
lend  large  volumes  of  credit  to  several  businessmen,  and  these  loans  were  not
repaid.  Ozden  later  rationalized  this  behavior  in  an  interview  as  trying  to
maintain  the  survival  of  these  businessmen  so  as  to  increase  the  possibility
of  Kastelli's  own  survival.  In  short,  financial  difficulties  pushed  Banker
Kastelli  to  choose  riskier  financial  strategies.
The  Response  of Policy  Makers: Initially,  policy  makers  had  confidence
in the  regulatory  powers  of the  market  As the  process  evolved,  they  seem  to
intervened  in and  liquidated  in  1983,  see  below.
13  For  example,  those  of Hisarbank,  Odibank,  Istanbul  Bankasi  (Colasan,  1984b,
p.  241).-9-
have  been  caught  by surprise. In February  1981,  by which  time  they  had  become
regular  participants  in the  banks'  meetings,  they  indicated  that  they  were
going  to  "make  sura  -hat  banks  do not  offer  interest  rates  higher  than  those
stipulated  in the  gentlemen's  agreement..[such]  banks  will  be severely
punished"  (Colasan  1984a,  p.163). Similar  threats  were also  made to  banks
that  were issuing  CDs  through  brokerage  houses. Policy  makers  thus  found
themselves  in  the  contradictory  position  of advocating  "free"  interest  rates
on the  one  hand  and  promo_ing  collusion  and  "responsible"  behavior  on the
other. It  was  also  clear  that  policy  makers  did  not  have  at their  disposal
any  means  to  measure  the  amount  of  CDs  that  were  so  marketed. These  threats
continued  to  be made  throughout  1981  and  1982,  but they  were  not  carried  out.
The  gentlemen's  agreements  also  included  statements  that  banks  which  did  not
comply  would  be punished,  however  the  nature  of the  penalties  were  not  made
explicit  and  no action  was actually  taken  during  that  period.
The Crisis. The system  exploded  in  1982. In  June,  Hisarbank  -a  member
of a  financial-industrial-construction  group-  which  was  for  a while  on the
verge  of  bankruptcy  due  to  the  bad  fortunes  of its  affiliates,  initiated  a
"campaign  of  high  interest  rates"  and  offered  as  high  as 80%  on  1 year
deposits. The  purpose  of  the  campaign  was  to finance  payments  that  were  due
to  depositors  and  other  holders  of the  bank's  liabilities.  The  response  of
depositors  was favorable  and  deposits  started  to  be transferred  to  Hisarbank
from  other  banks. Finally  in  the  next  meeting  of  banks  two  weeks  later,
representatives  of the  gover.ment  forced  the  banks  to  sign  a new  agreement:
Like  the  previous  ones,  the  agreement  stipulated  common  deposit  interest  rates
that  would  be observed  by banks  and  committed  them  to  cease  marketing  CDs
through  brokers. This  time,  however,  the  statement  also  included  explicit-10-
measures  to  be taken  against  non-compliers.  Three  days  after  the  meeting,  the
owner  of Banker  Kastelli,  which  had  by then  mar!eted  a large  portion  of
Hisarbank's  CDs,  fled  the  country.
It  was  during  thls  meeting  that  monetary  authorities  became  aware  of the
extent  of the  problem. It  became  clear  that  several  banks  were insolvent  and
unable  to  meet their  payments  on  CDs  thev  had  issued. Representatives  of the
Central  Bank  found  out  that  some  banks  actually  had  not  even  observed  their
reserve  requirements.  To  avoid  panic,  the  banks  were initially  provided  by
liquidity  from  the  Central  Bank  and  started  to  be monitored  closely. Some  of
the  bureaucrats  in  charge  of economic  affairs  resigned  in  July. The  new team
changed  the  policy  framework.  In  January  1983,  the  Central  Bank  started  to
reregulate  deposit  interest  rates  and  imposed  ceilings  at 45%  for  deposits  of
one  year  maturity. Later,  policy  makers  intervened  in five  private  banks,
removed  their  management  and  declared  them  bankrupt. The  liabilities  of four
of the  banks  (Istanbul  Bankasi,  Hisarbank,  Odibank  and  Bagbank)  were
transferred  to Fr  te owned  banks;  those  of the  fifth  bank (Isci  Kredi  Bankasi)
were taken  over  by the  largest  private  bank. Each  of these  five  bankrupt
banks  were  owned  or controlled  by  holding  companies.  Three'of  them  had
formed  their  own  brokerage  houses. In  addition  to those  banks,  several  major
brokerage  houses  also  went  bankrupt. Needless  to  say  financial  problems  were
not restricted  to those  institutions  that  went  bankrupt.  Non-performing  loans,
the  current  estimates  of  which  vary  between  10-30%  of total  assets  in the
banking  system,  continue  to  present  a major  policy  problem.
It is  worthwhile  to emphasize  the  extent  to  which  real  interest  rates
14  See  Artun  (1985),  p.48,53. Hisarbank  and  Odibank  were  members  of the  same
group,  Kozanoglu-Cavusoglu.-11-
increased  in this  period. One  has to  remember  that  official  data
underestimate  deposit  interest  rates  during  that  period,  since  they  correspond
to interest  rates  announced  in  gentlemen's  agreements  and  do not  reflect
higher  rates  offered  by  most  banks. Even  if  one  is  willing  to  assume  that  the
actual  deposit  rates  of interest  that  banks  offered  did  not  exceed  those
stipulated  in the  gentlemen's  agreements,  it  turns  out  that  the  real  ex-post
interest  rates  on 6-months  deposits  were  on average  15%  and  18%  in 1981  and
1982,  respectively  (see  Table:  1).  Table  1  also  shows  the  increase  in  real
lending  rates,  as calculated  by Easterly  (1988),  to  50%  in 1981  and  38%  in
1982.  In  December  1981  and  June  1982,  when  competition  between  banks  was  most
fierce,  ex-post  annual  compounded  real  rate  of interest  on 6-month  deposits
was  as  high  as 24%  and  20%  respectively. 15 One  could  ask  whether  this
increase  could  be primarily  attributed  to large  forecast  errors  in  banks'
prediction  of future  inflation.  A look  at the  trend  in  inflation  during  the
period  suggests  that  such  was  not  the  case:  Table  2 shows  that  the  annual  rate
of increases  of  both  the  consumer  and  the  wholesale  price  indices  were in  a
quite  persistent  decline  since  January  1981. One  can  therefore  conclude  that
banks'  need  for  funds  in  view  of large  amount  of  non-performing  loans,  and  the
consequent  interbank  competition  for  deposits  was  probably  a  more important
determinant  of  high real  rates.
The  rise  in  interest  rates  is  also  apparent  in  the  consolidated  balance
sheets  of  banks. In the  private  banks,  the  ratios  of  both  interest  income  and
expenses  to  average  stocks  of  credit  exceeded  40%  in 1982  (Table  3).  It  was
also  clear  that  interest  expenses  rose  faster  than  interest  income:  as shown
l'  The  announced  nominal  interest  rate  was  50%,  the  rate  of change  in the  CPI
was  26.3%  between  Dec.  1981-Dec.  1982  and  29.5%  between  June  1981-June  1982.-12-
in the  last  row  of Table  3, interest  margin  (interest  income  minus  interest
expenses) as percentage in average deposits declined substantially from
historical levels.  6
What  about  the  growth  of the  financial  system? As Table  4 indicates,
traditional  measures  of financial  deepening  show  improvements  in 1980-82:  both
the  real  money  stock  (M2)  and  the  liquidity  ratio  (M2  expressed  as  a
percentage  of  GNP) increased  in  1981-82  after  steep  declines  in  1978-80.
Notice  however,  that  the  growth  rate  of real  M2  was  reduced  by more  than  one
half  between  1981  and  1982,  from  34%  to  16%. The  level  of real  deposits
showed  similar  increases  in  1981  and 982.
The  counterpart  to increase  in  deposits  on the  asset  side  of the  banking
system  was a rapid  increase  in  real  indebtedness  of the  private  sector,
especially  in  1981,  despite  i)  narrowing  bank  margins  and  ii)  high  lending
rates. Total  assets  of the  banking  system  grew  in real  terms  by 31%  and  18%
in  1981  and 1982  (Table  5),  assets  of  private  domestic  banks  grew  by 35%  and
17%. In 1981,  the  rate  of increase  in the  stock  of credits  to the  private
sector  was 81%  in  nominal  terms  and  45% in  real  terms. Given  that  in  that
year  the  interest  rate  on loans  was  very  high,  the  increase  in  the  stock  of
credit  meant  a  heavy  repayment  burden  in  the  following  years. In fact,  "in
the  second  half  of 1982,  most  of real  credit  expansion  was  absorbed  by the
need  to refinance  part  of the  high  real  interest  rates  charged  to  private
enterprises."17  With  an inflation  rate  of 25%  in  1982,  the  increase  in the
le  An official  report  prepared  at the  time  claimed  that  the  interest  margin  of
credits  was  negative  in 1981  and  the  first  quarter  of 1982  (Colasan  1984b,
p.477). The  standard  practice  of banks  in  Turkey  was to  capitalize  interest
payments  when  they  were  due  and  thus  increase  the  principal  amount
outstanding. In  the  meantime,  interest  payments  that  were  not  collected  were
recorded  as income. Therefore  it is  highly  likely  that  income  statements,  on
which  figures  in  Table  3  are  based,  overstated  interest  income.
17 World  Bank,  1983,  pp.  11-12. The  same  observation  is  made  in  the
aforementioned  report:  "...the  banks'  inability  to  collect  interest  payments-13-
real  stock  of credit  was  12%  between  the  end  of 1981  and  1982,  not  a small
rate  of growth  compared  to  historical  averages. The total  stock  of
liabilities  of the  private  sector  to the  banking  system  increa3ed  at an  even
higher  rate  (17%)  in real  terms. Table  6 shows  that  despite  a decline  in
total  credits  from  the  finaancial  system  8 relative  to  GNP,  the  share  of the
private  sector  in total  claims  of  the  financial  system  increased  from  50%  in
1980  to 56%  in 1981  and  63%  in  1982. Of net  new  credits,  68%  went to  the
private  sector  in 1981  and  82%  in 1982. Notice  again,  however,  that  Table  5
shows  that  the  rate  of increase  in  both  real  and  nominal  stocks  of cred4.t  to
the  private  sector  were  cut  by  ha.f  between  1981  and  1982,  mirroring  the
reduction  in the  rate  of growth  of  M2.  The  decrease  in the  rate  of growth  of
money  and  credit  in  1982,  after  initial  spurts  in  1981,  is  not  surprising.
Furthermore,  growth  rates  in  1982  were  still  high. However,  with  high  debt
burdens  in  1982  and  reduced  repayment  capacity  due  to lower  corporate  gross
earnings  (see  Section  3),  these  reductions  probably  exacerbated  widespread
illiquidity  in the  private  sector  in  1982.
How  does  one  try  to  make  some  sense  out  of  all  this? Deferring  the  issue
of  what  kind  of a shock  created  financial  distress  in  the  corporate--and
consequently  in the  banking--sector  to  the  next  section,  let  us concentrate  on
how  banks  reacted  to financial  distress.  It is  clear  that  once  banks  were  hit
has seriously  affected  their  liquidity. In  spite  of this,  the  banks  have
refinanced  borrowers'  outstanding  interest  payments  and  thereby  have further
jeopardized  their  cash positions."  (Colasan,  1984b,  p.448,  my translation).
Similarly,  Celasun  and  Rodrik  (1987,  p.  4-17)  state:  "A significant  part
(guesstimates  running  around  40 to  60  percent)  of the  nominal  credit  expansion
in this  period  was  directed  to refinancing  of the  interest  payments  connected
with  non-performing  loans".
18  "Financial  system"  comprises all  banks  and  the  monetary  authority.-14-
and  problems  of insolvency  arose,  they  tried  their  best to  avoid  bankruptcy.
Given  high  probable  costs  to  bankruptcy,  legal  barriers  to  establish  new  banks
and  other  sunk  costs  that  need  to  be  borne  to  re-enter  the  market  after
bankruptcy,  possible  reputational  problems  and  possible  rents  to  bank
ownership  (see  below),  this  quest  for  survival  is  not  very  surprising.  The
more  interesting  question,  however,  was  the  mechanism. Once  hit  by an
earnings  shock,  which  makes  a  bank  unable  to  meet,  say,  its  interest  payments
to depositors  the  bank  will try  to  raise  additional  resources  to  meet  these
payments  and  to avoid  bankruptcy. 19  This  was  done  in  Turkey,  both  by raising
deposit  interest  rates  and  by issuing  CDs. However,  higher  promised  interest
payments  mean  higher  stock  of liabilities  in the  future. To cover  this  higher
stock  of liabilities,  the  bank  has  to  charge  higher  interest  rates  on its
loans.
What  klnd  of  borrowers  would  be willing  to accept  higher  lending  rates?
Holders  of its  non-performing  assets  may  be one  possibility.  The  bank  may  bet
on recovering  these  assets  in  the  future,  by refinancing  them  now.
Furthermore,  analogous  to the  bank,  a  borrowing  firm  which  is on the  verge  of
bankruptcy  will  be willing  to  accept  higher  lending  rates  if they  provide  a
possibility  for  survival. The  bank  may  be able  to charge  high interest  rates
also  to  borrowers  that  cannot  borrow  from  other  banks  because  of their  risk
characteristics--as  did,  for  example,  Kastelli,  once  financial  distress
occurred. Clearly  the  bank is  limited  by competition  from  other  banks  in the
interest  rate  it  can  charge  to  safe  borrowers.  Unavoidably,  then,  the
portfolio  of the  bank  has  to  become  more  risky. The  bank  will  typically  be
19  It is interesting  to  note  that  patterns  of  bank  behavior  described  here  are
similar  in  many  ways  to de  Juan's  (1987)  hypothetical  account  of how  good
bankers  turn  into  bad  bankers.-15-
willing  to take  additional  risks  since  it is  protected  by limited  liability. 20
But  this  is  clearly  inefficient:  At a time  when loanable  funds  were  most
needed  to solve  temporary  liquidity  problems  of good  firms,  a sizable  portion
of the  funds  may  end  up being  used  to finance  bad firms. This is  exactly  what
happened  in  Turkey,  especially  in the  case  of smaller  insolvent  banks.
Furthermore,  what  were  essentially  Ponzi  schemes  could  not  be prevented  by the
functioning  of the  market  mechanism,  and  apparently  required  intervention  by
the  state.  The  welfare  question  that  needs  to  be addressed,  then,  relates  to
additional  expected  losses  that  were incurred  after  the  banks  became
insolvent.  Why  was the  market  unsuccessful  in  driving  insolvent  banks  out  of
the  system?
The  preceding  question  may  be asked  much  more concretely:  Why  did
depositors  respond  favorably  to the  interest  rate  "campaign"  of Hisarbank?  It
is  well  known  that  return  to  depositors  is  not  monotonically  increasing  in the
nominal  promised  interest  rate  because  higher  interest  rates  mean  the
probability  that  they  will  be repaid  is  smaller;  when interest  rates  are  very
high  relative  to the  earnings  potential  of the  bank,  tnis  negative  effect
becomes  dominant  and  expected  return  to  depositors  starts  to  decline 21.
Clearly,  when  the  nominal  interest  rate  that  Hisarbank  offered  was 80%,  with  a
20  That is,  additional  risks  may increase  the  equity  value  of the  bank  while
decreasing  the  value  of  other  claims  on the  bank. The  proposition  that  equity
holders  of a  corporation  with  limited  liability  can  transfer  wealth  from
bondholders  (in  the  present  case,  depositors)  to themselves  by increasing  the
riskiness  of assets  has  been  discussed  extensively  in the  finance  literature.
See  for  example,  Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976). While  higher  risk  increases
returns  in good  states  and  decreases  them  in  bad states,  limited  liability
causes  the  payoffs  of  equity  holders  to  be biased  towards  good  states,  thereby
making  higher  risk  attractive.
21  The  non-monotonicity  of expected  returns  in contractual  interest  rates
forms  the  basis  of the  credit-rationing  literature:  See,  for  example  Stiglitz
and  Weiss (1983,1985).-16-
very  high  probability  of  bankruptcy,  the  expected  interest  rate  was  much
lower. Why  did  depositors  not  withhold  their  deposits?
One  can  develop  various  hypotheses  to explain  the  observed  behavior  of
depositors.  One  explanation  could  be that  because  information  about  banks'
asset  structures  and  balance  sheets  was so  scarce,  depositors  could  not tell
good  banks  from  bad  banks,  i.e.  there  was a  problem  of adverse  selection. If
the  problem  was  just  one  of adverse  selection,  however,  one  could  also  argue
that  the  level  of interest  rates  offered  by Hisarbank--during  a period  when
corporate  earnings  were  distressed,  illiquidity  was  widespread  and  therefore
expected  bank  profitability  was  low--should  have  acted  as a signal  revealing
tha  -he  high interest  rates  reflected  not  a  higher  profitability  potential
but  Hisarbank's  insolvency.
There  are  two  other  potential  explanations,  which,  interestingly,  are
based  on  completely  different  assumptions  about  depositors'  "rationality"  but
imply  very similar  behavior  and  market  outcomes. The  first  hypothesis  is
simple  and  can  be dubbed  "interest  rate  illusion':  Depositors  in  Turkey  were
simply  not  used  to a liberalized  financial  system,  and  the  developments  were
too  fast  for  them  to learn. Therefcre  depositors  confused  promised  interest
rates  with  expected  interest  repayments  and  did  not  adequately  take  into
consideration  the  riskiness  of  banks. The  second  hypothesis  maintains  that
depositors  are  on the  contrary  quite  rational: They  are  well  aware  of
potential  costs  of  bank  bankruptcies  when  depositors  are  not  protected--bank
runs,  increased  illiquidity,  disruptions  in  payment  mechanisms  and
production,=  let  alone  political  costs. Therefore,  they--correctly--foresee
that  if  a bank  goes  bankrupt  the  government  will  intervene  and  provide  ex-post
22  See  Diamond  and  Dybvig  (1983)  for  a formal  treatment  of these  ideas.-17-
deposic  guarantees--even  if an explicit  insurance  scheme  does  not  exist--in
order  to  maintain  the  stability  of  and  confidence  in  the  banking  system,  and
to avoid  bank runs  and  the  adverse  political  consequences  of letting
depositors  suffer. The  implication  of this  hypothesis  also  is that  depositors
respond  to  promised  rates  of interest,  believing  that  in  the  case  of
incomplete  repayment,  the  difference  will  be covered  by the  government.  This
argument  was  put  forward  in  accounts  of financial  crisis  in  Chile. 23
Anticipation  of  ex-post  deposit  guarantees  creates  an implicit  ex-ante  subsidy
from  the  government  that  is  shared  between  the  depositors  and  banks. Under
these  circumstances,  it  can  be shown  that  the  expected  profit  or equity  value
of a  bank  can  be positive,  even if  its  economic  value  (net  of implicit
subsidies)  is  negative.
What  happens  when  depositors  are  responsive  to  promised  rather  than
expected  interest  rates,  for  whatever  reason? The  basic  point  to  be made  is
that  markets  can  prevent  the  kind  of Ponzi  schemes  that  have  developed  in
Turkey  and  !nduce  the  exit  of  unprofitable  banks  and  firms  through
bankruptcies  only  if  depositors  withhold  their  funds  from  insolvent  banks.
Discounting  the  risk  element  in interest  rate  offers  prevents  exactly  that.
Absent  self  regulatory  mechanisms  in the  market,  efficiency  requires  that  a
supervisory  institution  monitor  banks  and  be ready  to intervene  and  liquidate
them  whenever  they  become  insolvent.  Such  a regulatory  framework  was  clearly
23  See  for  example,  Diaz  Alejandro  (1985)  p.8,  Harberger  (1985)  and  Hanna
(1987)  for  a discussion.  Hinds  (1987,  n.22)  cites  several  instances  of such
"ex-post  deposit  guarantees"  in  Chile,  Colombia  and  the  USA.  In  Tuiikey,  a
precedent  was  established  in  1960  when,  following  the  failure  of several
banks,  a Bank  Liquidation  Fund  was  established  to  pay  off  the  deposit  holders
of these  banks. All liabilities  of the  banks  were  covered. A deposit
insurance  scheme  was  formally  introduced  in  Turkey  in  1983. The  transfer  of
insolvent  banks'  assets  and  liabilities  to  state-owned  banks  in 1983
constituted  another  example  of ex-post  deposit  guarantees.-18-
absent  in the  1980-82  period. When  the  government  did  finally  intervene  in
1982,  it  was too  late.
3  - ADJUSTMENT  IN  THE CORPORATE  SECTOR
It  was  seen  in  the  previous  section  that  problems  in  the  banking  sector
began  when  an important  portion  of the  loan  portfolios  of the  banks  became
non-performing.  In this  section  I  would  like  to look  at the  other  side  of the
coin  and  review  the  performance  of the  corporate  sector--major  borrowers  of
banks,  especially  in 1981  and  1982--and  try  to  provide  answers  to the
following  types  of  questions:
a) Did  the  shocks  to the  corporate  sector  simply  consist  of increased  interest
expenses  or  did  adverse  cost/demand  conditions  also  play  a role?
b) How  did  firms  react  to  these  shocks  financially?  Is there  any  indication
that  distressed  firms  actually  increased  their  indebtedness  during  this
period?
To answer  these  questions,  a  panel  data  set  of firm-level  financial
statements  will  be analyzed. The  source  of  data  are  the  income  statements  and
balance  sheets  of a sample  of  91 firms  registered  at the  Capital  Markets  Board
(CMB)  of  Turkey. The same  data  set  has  been  used  by Ersel  and  Sak  (1986)  in  a
similar  study. The  data  is  available  for  the  period  1979-84.
It  should  be noted  at the  outset  that  the  sample  is  not  representative  of
all  private  sector  firms  in  Turkey. First,  all  of the  firms  are  issuers  of
either  stocks  and/or  bonds  to  the  public  or  have  at least  100  shareholders.
Second,  the  average  scale  of the  corporations  in the  sample  is  large,  so that
the  firms  in the  data  set  can  be taken  as  representative  of large  corporate
sector  only. The  following  table,  taken  from  Ersel  and  Sak (1986,  p.93),
compares  the  average  total  assets  of firms  in  the  CMB  sample  sample  and  those-19-
in  samples  compiled  by the  Ystanbul  Chamber  of Industry  (ICI):24
1981  1982  1983
CMB  ICI  CMB  ICI  CMB  ICI
Average assets - - -
(Million  Ti)  3264  222  5079  347  6848  487
Besides  possible  selectivity  bias,  the  reader  should  also  be cautioned
that  additional  biases  exist  since  the  data  is  not  corrected  for  inflation.
The  section  will  proceed  as follows. First  profitability  will  be
defined. It  will then  be decomposed  into  standard  finarpial  ratios  that
capture  real  and  financial  factors  that  affect  profitabilitj  as  well as  the
firm's  financial  response  to  movemerts  in  these  factors. After  summarizing
the  movements  in  the  ratios  over  time,  a simple  analysis  of variance  model
will  be used to  statistically  compare  average  values  of the  ratios  across  time
and  groups  of firms. 25
Profitabilit!  and  its  com2onents:  I  define  profitability  (PR)  as the
ratio  of  pre-tax  income  (Y)  to the  book  value  of  equity  (E):
PR - Y/E. 6
Then,  PR  can  be decomposed  in the  following  way:
(1)  PR - [(EBIT.AU) - (FC*GR)]  /  (1-GR)
where
EBIT  - EBIT margin,  earnings  before  interest  and  taxes  divided  by  net  sales
income,
AU - asset  utilization  ratio;  net  sales  income  over  total  assets
FC - financial  costs  ratio;  interest  expenses  over  total  debt
24  The  ICI  samples  comprise  more  than  1200  firms.
25  The  approach  adopted  here  is similar  to  Petrei  and  Tybout  (1985).
26  The  variables  are  defined  In  Appendix  1.-20-
GR  - gearing  ratio;  total  debt  divided  by total  assets.
The decomposition  in  equation  (1)  is  useful  because  it  helps  one identify
the  real  and  financial  factors  that  affect  profitability.  Real  factors  are
captured  by EBIT  and  AU.  Movements  in  EBIT  are  primarily  determined  by
movements  in  sales  and  non-interest  costs. EBIT  can  be further  divided  into
sub-components,  the  most important  of  which  is gross  margin  (GM,  net  sales
income  minus  cost  of goods  sold  divided  by  net sales  income). 27 Changes  in  GM
reflect  changes  in the  price  of output  relative  to input  prices  and  therefore
is  expected  to  be closely  influenced  by such  economic  variables  as  demand,
wages,  exchange  rate,  and  policies  that  affect  these  variables. The  asset
utilization  ratio,  AU, reflects  the  rate  at  which  assets  of the  firm  generate
sales  income. It is generally  interpreted  as a  proxy  for  capacity
utilization;  it is  also  analogous  to  average  output-capital  ratio. Everything
else  constant,  increases  in  EBIT,  GM and  AU effect  profitability  positively.
Financial  factors  are  captured  by FC and  GR.  FC is  influenced  by
interest  rate  and  monetary/credit  policies. Everything  else  constant,  an
increase  in  financial  costs  reduces  profitability.  The importance  of
financial  costs  for  a firm's  profits  is  directly  proportional  to the  firm's
level  of indebtedness.  Gearing  ratio  (or  leverage)  is  an indicator  of the
firm's  indebtedness.  In general  GR will  be interpreted  as firms'  response  to
changes  in the  other  variables.
The  analysis  of  variance  model: Once  these  financial  ratios  were
calculated,  each  of them  were  statistically  compared  across  time  and  groups  of
27 Other  components  of EBIT,  namely  overhead  and  other  net income  (see
Appendix  1 for  definitions)  are  small  in the  CMB  dataset.  Furthermore,
relatively  large  recording  errors  have  been  detected  in these  variables. See
Ersel  and  Sak  (1986),  Appendix  A.2.  Therefore,  these  components  will  not  be
treated  individually.-21-
firms  through  a  simple  analysis  of  variance  (ANOVA)  model. 28 Let  T stand  for
the  number  of observations  for  each  firm  and  N for  the  number  firms  in the
data  set  (assuming,  for  the  moment,  that  the  data  is  balanced). Total
variation  in  each  of the  variables  was  decomposed  into  three  effects:
r - DF  * F  +  Dy py  +  DL  PL  +  e.
where
r - the  financial  variable  analyzed
DF  NTxN matrix  of firm  effect  dummy  variables. The  j'th  column  of this
matrix  consists  of  ones  for  firm  j  and  zeros  otherwise.
DY  - NTxT matrix  of  year  effect  dummy  variables. The  t'th column  of this
matrix  consists  of  ones  for  year  t and  zeros  otherwise.
DL - NTxT matrix  of  nested  year/loss  effect  dummy  variables. The  t'th  column
of this  matrix  consists  of ones  for  observations  that  have  made  negative
profits  in  year t,  and  zeros  otherwise.
F0FT 8y and  PL  are  vectors  of  regression  coefficients  (of  dimensions  Nxl,
Txl  and  Txl,  respectively)  and  e is  an  NTxl (column)  vector  of independently
and  identically  distributed  disturbances.
The  firm  effects  are  assumed  to  capture  the  individual  characteristics  of
firms  that  stay  constant  across  time. The  year  effects  capture  the influence
of  macroeconomic  variables  that  affect  all  firms  equally  within  a year  but
which  change  over  time. Finally,  the  matrix  of "year/loss  effects"  was  used
to  statistically  compare,  in  each  year,  the  performance  of the  variables
across  firms  that  recorded  non-negative  and  negative  profits. The  year/loss
effects  were  used  as  a proxy  to  measure  the  (marginal)  effect  of falling  into
a state  of financial  distress. 29
28 An ANOVA  model  consists  of OLS  regressions  on dummy  variables.
29  The  number  of  observations  with  negative  profits  are  11 in 1979  and  1980
(12%  of all  observations),  24 (26%)  in 1981,  22 (24%)  in 1982,  14 (22%)  in-22-
Since  as they  stand,  the  D matrices  are  not  linearly  independent,  I  have
normalized"  the  system  so that  the  regression  coefficients  are  expressed  as
differences  from  the  1979  year  effects. Let  the  coefficients  of the  new  model
be given  by Bp,  By  and  BL. These  coefficients  should  be interpreted  in  the
following  manner:
i)  the (T-1)  elements  of  By  reflect  the  average  differences  of the  dependent
variable  relative  to its  average  value  in 1979,  for  the  observations  that
correspond  to  non-negative  profits.
ii)  the (T)  elements  of Bs  reflect  the  average  differences  of the  dependent
variable  for  observations  with  negative  profits,  relative  to those  with  non-
negative  profits.
The (N-1)  elements  of  BF  will  not  be reported.
There  were  strong  outliers  for  all  of the  financial  ratios. Host
outliers  corresponded  to observations  with  very  high losses.  In some  cases
they  suggested  implausible  ratios  (such  as gross  margins  of -600%),  maybe  due
to  recording  errors. Since  in the  presence  of strong  outliers  the  estimated
coefficients  do not  adequately  reflect  the  bulk  of the  sample--especially  in  a
simple  linear  model  such  as the  present  one--,  observations  for  which  the
estimated  error  term  was  at least  three  times  the  standard  error  of  regression
were  deleted  from  the  sample  and  the  model  was  reestimated.  The  largest
number  of observations  deleted  in this  manner  was 7.  The  results  reported
below  belong  to this  second  round  of estimation.  Results  obtained  when
1983  and  8 (15%)  in 1984.
30  Here  normalization  simply  means  to  delete  just  enough  columns  from  the  D
matrices  such  that  the  resulting  system  is  linearly  independent,  to  avoid  a
typical  "dummy  variable  trap."-23-
outliers  are  not omitted  are  discussed  in  Appendix  2.31
F-statistics  were  calculated  for  each  of the  dependent  variables  to test
the  following  null  hypotheses:
Hi:  Differences  across  firms  are  not statistically  significant  (i.e.  all
elements  of Bp  are  0).  Rejection  of this  hypothesis  would  mean  that  firm
effects  as a  whole  are  significantly  different  from  zero,  i.e.  that  individual
firm  characteristics  are  important.
H2:  Differences  across  years  are  not  statistically  significant  (i.e.  all
elements  of  By  are  0).  Rejection  of this  hypothesis  would  mean  that  the
average  annual  values  of the  dependent  variable  are  not the  same  across  years;
i.e.  that  macro  effects  are  significantly  different  from  zero.
H3:  Differences  across  observations  with  non-negative  and  negative
profits  are  not  significant  (i.e.  all  elements  of BE are  0).
H4:  Differences  between  observations  with  non-negative  and  negative
profits  are  the  same  across  years  (i.e.  all  elements  of  BL are  equal  to  each
other).
The formulation  of the  null  hypotheses  H3 and  H4 may  deserve  some
comment: H3 is  used  to test  whether  the  values  of the  dependent  variable  are
on average  equal  between  the  two  groups  of firms. When this  hypothesis  is
rejected,  one  concludes  that,  for  that  dependent  variable,  making  losses
matter  on average. Suppose  now  that  this  is the  case  for  a  particular
variable,  and  therefore  that  there  is  a statistically  significant  difference
31  Furthermore,  some  corrections  had  to  be made  on the  data  to  eliminate
discontinuities  and  inconsistencies  that  were  created  by the  adoption  of an
inflation  accounting  scheme  in  1983. These  corrections  required  additional
information  on firms. Ersel  and  Sak,  1986,  Appendix  A.2  discusses  the  problem
and  the  additional  information  necessary  to correct  it.  Such  additional
information  could  not  be found  for  some  firms. As a result,  27  observations
in  1983  and  37  observations  in 1984  had to  be deleted.-24-
between  the  averages  of two  groups  of firms. One  may  also  want to  know
whether  that  difference  is  of the  same  magnitude  in  each  year. H4 tests  this
constancy  of the  difference  across  years.
EmRirical  results: Before  turning  to the  statistical  results,  it  will  be
useful  to take  a look  at  how the  (unweighted)  averages  of financial  ratios
evolved  over  time. These  are  summarized  in  Table  7.32  First  of all,  we see
in the  first  row  of that  table  that  profitability  declined  substantially,  from
42%  in 1980  to .5%  in 1982,  and  started  to  pick  up in  1983  and  1984. Several
factors  have  contributed  to  the  decline. The  first  is  the  decline  in gross
margins. The  second  row  of  Table  7  shows  that  between  1980  and  1982  gross
margins  declined  from  26%  to 19%,  and  continued  to  decrease  in 1983. The
movements  in  GM clearly  indicate  that  sales  prices  increased  less  rapidly  than
the  prices  of inputs  used  in  production  during  these  years.  EBIT  margin  has
also  declined  during  that  period.
How  can  one  account  for  the  reduction  in  GM  and  EBIT? One  explanation
may  be demand;  increase  in  domestic  absorption  was still  quite  weak in 1981
and  1982. However  total  sales  of firms  in  the  data  set  did increase  in  real
terms  during  these  years. Increase  in  costs  was  probably  more  important.
Using  consolidated  figures  from  another  data  set,  Akyuz  (1988)  shows  that  raw
material  costs  increased  substantially  during  these  years,  reflecting  the
impact  of two  stabilization  policies  on  corporate  income  statements:  a) the
impact  of large  devaluations  on the  cost  of imported  inputs,  and  b) increases
in the  prices  of state  economic  enterprises  which  produce  intermediate
32 Stocks  such  as total  assets,  total  debt  and  equity  in  year  t  are  expressed
as averages  of  years  t-I  and  t.  Therefore,  the  1979  values  of ratios  that
involved  stocks  were  not  calculated.  The  total  number  of observations  that
did  not involve  stocks  was  482,  whereas  the  total  number  of observations  for
ratios  that  did  involve  stocks  was 391.-25-
inputs.3
The  fluctuations  in the  asset  utilization  ratio  are  less  pronounced  -
except  for  the  decline  in 1981. It should  be noted  at this  point  that
capacity  utilization  was already  at  very  low  levels  in  the  late  1970s,  mainly
due  to a foreign  exchange  crisis  that  prevented  the  use  of  necessary  imported
inputs.
Moving  down  Table  7,  financial  costs  have increased  between  1980  and
1982,  from  13%  to  18%.34  The  increase  in  FC reflects  the  effect  of  money  and
credit  policies  on the  cost  of firms'  borrowing.
However,  contrary  to the  expectations  of policy  makers,  the  increase  in
the  cost  of  borrowing  did  not induce  firms  to  decrease  their  leverage  in  the
period  1980-82. In  fact,  simultaneous  with  the  increase  in financial  costs,
the  gearing  ratio  also increased  from  69%  to 73%  during  these  years.
How significant  were  these  changes?  To answer  this  question,  we can  now
have  a look  at the  statistical  results. These  are  displayed  in  Table  8.  Each
block  in  Table  8 first  displays  the  values  of  By  and  BL,  the  estimated
coefficients  of the  year  and  loss  effects,  respectively.  After  that,  each
block  displays  the  results  of four  F tests  mentioned  above:  The  values  P1 - P4
are  the  levels  of significance  at  which  the  hypotheses  Hl - H4 can  be
rejected,  respectively.  For  example  a value  of  0.012  for  P4 in the  block  for
the  variable  GR indicates  that  the  hypothesis  H4 can  be rejected  at 1.2%  level
of significance.  A high  value  of P  means  that  that  particular  hypothesis
33  Part  of the  increase  in  costs  may  be due  to the  fact  that  some  interest
expenses  are  recorded  under  Cost  of  Goods  Sold.  See  the  note  below.
34  Interest  expense  figures  in income  statements  probably  underestimate  true
interest  expenses  because  a) some  interest  payments  are  recorded  under  the
cost  of goods  sold  account  and  cannot  be retrieved,  and  b) firms  that  borrowed
from  islamic  banks  do not  record  their  payments  as interest  expenses.-26-
cannot  be rejected  at traditional  levels  of significance.  Finally,  the  stars
on the  values  of the  coefficients  indicate  the  results  of individual  t-tests.
Starting  with  profitability  in  the  first  block,  once  loss  making
observations  are  controlled  for,  the  drop  in  the  profitability  of firms  with
positive  profits  is  much less  pronounced  and  statisti-ally  insignificant.  As
one  would  expect,  the  significance  of the  loss  effect  is  high.  Furthermore,
the  value  of P4  shows  that  the  changes  in the  difference  between  the
profitability  of firms  making  positive  profits  on the  one  hand,  and  losses  on
the  other,  is  also  significant.  Another  surprising  result  is that  firm
effects  turn  out  to  be insignificant:  P1  has  a value  of 1.0.  In  all  other
ratios,  the  individual  characteristics  of firms  turn  out  to  be quite
significant  in  explaining  the  variations  of the  dependent  variables.
In the  second  block  in  Table  8, one  sees  that  the  decline  in  gross
margins  is  significant,  and  average  GM ratio  o' loss-making  observations  is
significantly  lower:  the  values  of  both  P2  and  P3 low. However,  the
hypothesis  that  the  difference  between  the  two  groups  of firms  is  constant
cannot  be rejected  at 10%  level  of significance.  Therefore,  the  increasing
differential  between  the  profitability  of the  two  groups  of firms  cannot  be
explained  solely  by the  performance  of the  GM ratios.
The  reduction  in EBIT  is  very  small  and  not  significant  for  profit  making
observations.  Loss  making  observations  have  persistently  lower  EBIT  margins.
The  absolute  value  of the  difference  between  the  EBIT  margins  of the  two
groups  has  declined  from  0.27  to  0.20  between  1979-82  with fluctuations  in  the
intervening  years.
The  changes  in the  ratio  of asset  utilization  is  not  significant  for
observations  with  positive  profits:  H2 cannot  be rejected  at traditional-27-
levels  of significance.  Firms  making  losses  have  significantly  lower  AU
ratios  (low  P3).  Again,  the  difference  between  the  two  groups  of firms
significantly  decrease  over  time:  The  value  of  BL  increases  from  -0.441  in
1980  to -0.015  in 1984,  with  a P4  value  of  6.9%.
The  increase  in  average  financial  costs  between  the  years  1980-82  is
significant,  as  expected. The  interesting  point  is that  the  FC ratios  of
observations  with  losses  do not  seem  to  be significantly  higher  than  those
with  profits:  the  hypothesis  that  all  the  elements  of  BL  are  zero  cannot  be
rejected  at the  10%  level  of significance.  Notice  that  the  t-statistics  of
the  coefficients  EL are  also  low. Hence  financial  costs  are  not important  in
explaining  the  difference  in the  profitability  of the  two  groups  of firms. 35
The  results  obtained  so far  can  be summarized  as follows: In  the  1980-82
period  there  has  been  a decrease  in  the  profitability  of firms  in the  CMB  data
set. Although  financial  costs  have  increased  considerably  during  those  years,
that  component  of profitability  does  not  explain  the  poorer  performance  of
firms  with losses. On the  other  hand,  loss  making  observations  have
significantly  lower  GM,  EBIT and  AU ratios.
If  this  interpretatior.  is  correct,  then  it  can  safely  be said  that  firms
were  hit  by two  shocks  in  1980-82: the  interest  rate  shock  took  place  almost
simultaneously  with the  demand  shock,  as reflected  in the  decline  in  gross
margins. A look  at the  movements  in leverage  can  now  give  us an idea  about
how  firms  adjusted  financially  to these  shocks. Also,  the  lower  levels  of  GM,
EBIT  and  AU explain  only  the  existence  of the  profitability  gap  between  the
two  groups  of observations;  why  the  gap  has increased  between  1980-82  requires
further  explanation.
35  This  result  changes  when  outliers  are  not  omitted. See  Appendix  2.-28-
To  prepare  the  stage,  let  us think  about  the  ways  in  which  a firm  can
finance  a loss.  It  would  have  basically  three  options,  or  a combination
thereof:  sell  assets  (or  reduce  liquid  assets),  increase  equity  or increase
debt.  If  the  rate  of growth  of  assets  is  positive,  as in the  CMB  se-mple  for
both  groups  of firms,  then  a loss  with  a contemporaneous  increase  in leverage
would  suggest  that  the  loss  has  been  financed  by more  debt  than  equity.
Table  8 shows  that  the  increase  in the  debt  to  asset  ratios  of  profit
making  firms  was  statistically  insignificanc  (P2  value  of 12%). The  movements
in the  leverage  of loss  making  firms,  on the  other  hand,  is  significanc.  In
1980,  the  leverage  of  observations  with  losses  was  on  average  6  percentage
points  higher  than  that  of the  firms  in  the  other  group,  and  the  difference
increased  to 16  percentage  points  in 1982  and  15  percentage  points  in  1984.
Furthermore,  this  increase  in the  difference  was  significant.  Since  the  rate
of growth  of assets  was  positive  in this  period  for  both  groups  of firms,
these  results  suggest  that  firms  financed  their  losses  by  borrowing  relatively
more,  in  exactly  the  same  period  when  cost  of borrowing  increased
substantially.  These  results  also  lead  to the  following  rather  surprising
conclusion:  the  gap  in  the  average  profitability  between  the  two  groups  of
observations  is  primarily  to  be explained  by the  increases  in the  leverage  of
loss-making  observations  during  a  period  of  higher  financial  costs.
Everything  else  constant,  an increase  in the  cost  of  borrowing  is
expected  to induce  firms  to  hold  less  debt. The  apparent  higher  borrowing  in
the  present  sample  must  have  occurred  due  to  a shift  in the  demand  curve  for
loans  rather  than  a movement  along  it.
What  might  have  caused  such  a  shift  in the  demand  for  loans  is  a  question
that  requires  further  research. One  variable  that  the  present  analysis-29-
suggests  is  the  drop in  earnings. There  are  at least  two  ways in  which  a
decrease  in  gross  earnings  could  induce  firms  to  use  relatively  more  debt  than
equity. The  first  one  has to  do  with liquidity  constraints.  A drop  in
earnings  decreases  the  ability  of firms  to finance  current  expenditures,
including  expenditures  on interest. While  depressed  asset  markets  made  it
difficult  for  firms  to sell  assets,  the  thinness  of equity  markets  and/or
owners'  unwillingness  to share  or lose  control  of corporations  limited  the
extent  to  which  financing  can  be secured  through  outside  equity. Therefore
firms  with low  earnings  have to  rely  more  heavily  on debt. What about  the
expectations  of policy  makers  that  owners  of corporations  would  liquidate
their  personal  wealth  and  use  it to  finance  their  corporations?  This  leads  to
the  second  explanation.  On the  one  hand,  one  might  argue  that  the  personal
wealth  of firm  owners  was simply  not  enough  to  finance  the  gap  produced  by the
reduction  in  earnings  and  increases  in interest  costs. One  the  other  hand,
one  might  go one  step  furlher  and  argue  that  even  if  personal  wealth  was
sufficient,  the  owners  might  not  have  had  the  incentive  to  allocate  them  to
finance  their  firms. The  idea  is  that  if  the  perception  of owner/managers
about  the  near  future  is  bleak,  in  the  sense  that  the  perceived  probability
bankruptcy  is  high,  then  they  will  prefer  to  borrow  rather  than  jeopardize
their  personal  wealth  by advancing  it towards  a  risky  activity. This  is
especially  true  when  high  deposit  interest  rates  increase  the  opportunity  cost
of investing  personal  wealth  in  the  corporation  rather  than  holding  it  as
deposits  on  a personal  account. 3 6 The  two  explanations  are  not  mutually
36  What is  at  play  here  is  again  the  effect  of limited  liability.  Although  an
increase  in  debt  relative  to  equity  would  probably  decrease  the  total  (debt
plus  equity)  value  of the  firm  when the  cost  of borrowing  is  high,  it  may
increase  the  expected  wealth  of the  owner,  where  wealth  consists  of  personal
wealth  plus the  exnected  equit value  of the  firm. With a  high  probability  of
bankruptcy,  even  if the  nominal  cost  of  debt  is  high,  exnected  cost  of debt
may  still  be lower  than  the  cost  of equity.-30-
exclusive  and  possibly  both  carry  an element  of truth. The  implications  of
these  explanations  are  consistent  with the  comparative  performance  of firms  in
the  years  1980-82  and  1984. In  the  1980-82  period,  debt  to asset  ratios
increased  because  lower  asset  returns  dominated  the  effects  of increased
financial  costs. In 1984,  however,  both  rates  of return  on assets  and
financial  costs  were  high,  and,  firms  responded  by lowering  their
indebtedness.
4 - CONCLUSION
There  were,  basically,  two  somewhat  related  stories  laid  out  in this
paper. The  first  one  was  about  the  response  of the  banking  system  to
deregulation.  It  was  argued  that  the  complete  absence  of a regulatory
framework  allowed  insolvent  banks  to  avoid  bankruptcy  by offering  high rates
to depositors,  using  funds  thus  collected  to finance  their  obligations  and
refinance  non-performing  loana. The  second  one  was related  to the  response  of
firms. Contrary  to the  expectations  of policy  makers,  firms  that  made  losses
were  shown  to increase  their  debt  to asset  ratios  even  though  cost  of
borrowing  had increased.  It is  not  possible  to  clearly  demonstrate  the
correspondence  between  these  two  stories. Although  in  the  CMB  data  set  there
were  some  observations  with  negative  book  values  of  net  worth,  it is  not  clear
how  many firms  that  had low  earnings  were  actually  insolvent.
However,  there  is  a unifying  theme  between  the  two  stories: The
unexpected  consequences  of deregulation  and  increases  in  the  level  of
indebtedness  of firms  seemed  to  be generated  by a drop  in  the  earnings  of the
corporate  sector  that  resulted  from  stabilization  policies  and  the  radical
changes  in the  economic  environment.  Once  firms  and  banks  are  hit  by-31-
financial  distress,  and  if  bankruptcy  entails  private  costs,  then  they  should
be  expected  to  implement  risky  survival  strategies.  These  strategies  may  even
involve  financing  of  firms  or  banks  with  negative  economic  values;  as  long  as
the  ex-ante  eguitX  values  of  these  projects  are  positive,  due  to,  for  example,
anticipations  of  ex-post  deposit  guarantees.  Furthermore,  there  does  not  seem
to  exist  in  the  market  a  mechanism  to  ensure  the  exit  of  these  firms  or  banks.
What  the  Turkish  experience  points  out  is  a  potential  inconsistency  between
macroeconomic  stabilization  policies,  that  do  involve  radical  changes  in  the
economic  environment,  and  financial  liberalization,  especially  when  the  latter
is implemented  without  an  adequate  regulatory  framework.
This  last  qualification  is  important.  Given  the  liquidity  problems  that
arose  in  the  corporate  sector,  continuing  to  suppress  deposit  interest  rates
at  negative  real  levels  would  probably  have  made  things  worse.  There  was  a
clear  need  to  mobilize  additional  financial  resources.  We have  seen  that
interest  rates  were  quite  effective  in  mobilizing  financial  resources.  What
was  questionable  however  was  the  allocative  efficiency  of  interest  rates:  once
mobilized,  substantial  resources  were  used  to  prolong  survival  rather  than  to
alleviate  temporary  liquidity  problems  or  finance  investment.  Presumably,
this  additional  loss  could  have  been  prevented  by  active  supervision  of  the
banking  system  and/or  by  setting  interest  rate  ceilings  at some  maximum
positive  sustainable  level.-32-
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APPENDIX 1: Format of Financial Statements of Firms in the CMB Data Set.
Balance Sheet
ASSETS  LIABILITIES
Cash and Equivalents  Al  Short Term Bank Loans  Ll
Securities  A2  Other Current Liabilities  L2
Accounts Receivable  A3  Current Liabilities  L3
Inventories  A4  Outstanding Bonds  IA
Other Current Assets  A5  Long Term Bank Loans  L5
Current Assets  A6  Other Long Term Liabilities  L6
Long Term Receivables  A7  Long Term Liabilities L7
Participations  A8  Total Debt  D
Net Fixed Assets  A9  Paid-in-Capital  El
Investments in Progress  A10  Reserves  E2
Other Fixed Assets  All  Allowances  E3
Noncurrent Assets  A12  Revaluation Fund  E4
Losses from Previous  Years  E5
Pretax Income  E6
Net Worth  E
Total Assets  A  Total Liabilities  L
Income Statement
Yl-Net Sales Income  (1)
Y2-Cost Of Goods Sold  (2)
Y3-Gross Profit  (3-1-2)
.Y4-Operating  Expenses  (4)
YS-Operating Income  (5-3-4)
Y6-Other Income  (6)
Y7-Other  expenses  (7)
Y8-Interest  expenses  (8)
Y9-Pretax Income  (9-5+6-7-8)
Financial Ratiosi
GM-Y3/Yl  Gross Margin
AU-Yl/A  Asset Utilization
FC-Y8/D  Average Financial Costs
GR-D/A  Gearing Ratio
PR-Y9/E  Rate of Return on Equity
EBIT-(Y5+Y6-Y7)/Yl  EBIT  (earnings  before  interest  and  taxes)  Margin.-35-
APPENDIX  2:  Regression  Results  When  Outliers  Are  Not  Omitted
In general,  outliers  that  were  omitted  correspond  to  observations  with  very
high losses. The  most  significant  changes  that  occur  in  the  regression
results  when  outliers  are  not  omitted  are  the  following:
a)  There  is  a general  reduction  in  the  values  of t-statistics  and  number  of
coefficients  that  are  significantly  different  from  zero. The  general  time
profiles  of  B.  and  BL do  not  change  very  much.
b) The  results  of all  of the  F-tests  for  PR,  EBIT  and  GR remain  qualitatively
the  same  when  outliers  are  not  omitted.
c) For  GM,  there  were four  observations  that  were  omitted. All  four  belonged
to a single  firm  that  made  heavy  losses  (the  GM ratio  of that  firm  in  1982  was
-600%). Once these  observations  are  included  in  the  data  set,  Hypothesis  H2
can  no longer  be rejected. Hypothesis  H4,  on the  other  hand,  can  be rejected
at the  5%  level. What is  happening  here is  that  inclusion  of these
observations  decreases  the  relative  importance  of  variations  in the  dependent
variable  from  one  year  to  the  other  (the  year  effect),  while  increasing  the
importance  of  variations  across  observations  with  positive  and  negative
profits  (the  loss  effect).
d) For  FC,  there  were two  observations  that  were  omitted. When these  are
included,  both  H3 and  H4 can  be rejected;  in  other  words,  inclusion  of these
outliers  results  in  concluding  that  observations  witb  losses  did  have  higher
average  financial  costs.- 36  -
Table  1: Interest  Rates  (%)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984
a)  Real  Lending  Rate  -0.6  50.2  37.7  28.0  28.7
b)  Nominal  Deposit  Rate  13.5  45.2  50.0  37.5  49.1
c)  Inflation  Rate (1  year  ahead) 36.6  30.8  32.9  48.4  45.0
d)  Ex-post  Real  Deposit  Rate  -16.6  14.9  17.6  -5.0  7.0
Sources:
a) Easterly  (1988),  Table  6.
b) Central  Bank  of the  Republic  of  Turkey  (6  month  deposits).
c) State  Institute  of Statistics,  average  annual  change  in CPI  in the
following  year.
d) Calculated  as
(1  +  rt/2)2
(1  + Pt)
where  rt  is  given  in (a),  and  Pt  is the  average  inflation  rate  between  year  t
and  t+l,  as given  in (c).
Table  2:  Annual  rates  of inflation  (%)
Consumer  Wholesale
Prices  Prices
1981  Jan.  82  86
Feb.  56  47
March  45  40
April  38  34
May  30  33
June  30  38
July  33  38
August  33  37
Sept.  33  37
Oct.  29  30
Nov.  28  27
Dec.  28  26
1982  Jan.  26  25
Feb.  24  24
March  26  30
April  25  34
May  23  32
June  23  24
Consumer  price  index:  State  Institute  of Statistics
Wholesale  Prices:  Treasury
Rates  of change  relative  to the  same  month
of the  previous  year.- 37  -
Table  3: Statistics  on  private  commercial  banks
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984
(1)  Assets  218.6  316.3 457.5  737.5  1418.7  2148.6  2709.4  4243.9
-Credits  106.5  145.3 207.5  356.8 654.6  973.7  1222.0  1608.2
(2)  Liabilities  218.6  316.3 457.5  737.5  1418.7  2148.6  2709.4  4243.9
-Deposits  151.4  204.6 310.1 518.3  1080.6  1552.6  1879.3  3208.7
(3)  Average  Credits  95.9  124.4 173.6 272.1 483.3  798.4  1090.8  1402.0
(4)  Interest  Income  12.9  18.0  27.7  68.1  182.9 338.0 448.0  813.4
(5)  Interest  Expense  6.5  9.1  15.6  36.8 144.2  326.7 416.8  723.3
(6)  Ave.  Interest  Inc. 3.5  14.5  16.0  25.0  37.8  42.3  41.1  58.0
(7)  Ave.  Interest  Exp. 6.8  7.3  9.0  13.5  29.8  40.9  38.2  51.6
(8)  Interest  Margin  6.7  6.2  7.0  11.5  8.0  1.4  2.9  6.4
(3):  Geometric  average
(6)  - (4)./(3)
(7)  - (5)/(3)
(8)-[(4)-(5)]/(3).
Source:  Turkish  Bankers  Association
Table  4: Indicators  of financial  deepening
% Share  in  GNP (a)  Growth  Rate (%,constant  prices)
Deposits  Deposits
M2  Private  M2  Private
Total  domestic  banks  Total  domestic  banks
1978  22.22  18.69  13.64  -9.09  -12.29  -10.19
1979  19.64  16.14  11.61  -12.23  -11.14  -19.77
1980  15.77  13.39  9.04  -16.76  -8.29  -16.37
19131  18.94  17.29  11.42  33.85  63.26  40.04
i982  23.94  23.33  14.83  16.49  26.33  12.69
1983  25.17  25.21  14.79  -9.49  -8.57  -16.40
1984  22.61  14.84  13.38  6.28  -54.19  -10.19
Source:  K2 from  IFS.
Deposits  from  Turkish  Bankers'  Association.
(a):  Stocks  expressed  as geometric  averages.
(b):  Year-end  stocks  deflated  by the  December  values  of  WPI,  IFS,
Supplement  of Price  Statistics,  1986.- 38  -
.. ______-_--------------------____.__
Table  5:  Assets  of  the  banking  system
-- __  -_.__  - ---  --  ---  ----------- __  _  ..  _  __
2 aamaal  growti2  Xnnaul  G,owth
I  of  GNP  (a)  (current  pricos)  tb)  Contes:t  prices)  (c)
Total  tOUl  Total
Credit  to  Claims  oan  Credit  to  Claims  an  Ceedlt  to  Claims  on
Total  Private  Private  Total  Privatt  Private  Total  Private  Private
Assets  sectow  Secteo  Asets  sector  Sector  Assets  sector  Sector
1977  51.3  20.4  20.9  37.6  27.3  27.4  1.1  -6.6  -6.6
1976  47.4  17.5  17.9  34.6  26.0  26.6  -6.1  -15.4  -15.0
1979  41.2  14.1  14.5  54.9  46.3  46.1  -14.?  -19.4  -19.5
1940  36.1  11.0  11.3  106.4  73.1  73.4  6.1  -11.0  -10.9
1961  44.6  13.1  13.6  63.4  *0.7  64.5  30.7  44.6  49.2
1962  52.3  15.7  17.1  46.1  41.0  47.3  16.1  .12.4  17.4
1963  5t.7  14.4  19.2  41.7  34.3  49.3  2.0  -4.7  4.0
1934  55.5  13.3  17.1  42.2  32.5  33.9  9.4  -10.0  -9.8
Soure:  Centra.  Bank.  Quarterly  IulletI.
Excludes  lvemstmt  and daelopa_t  banks.
Total.  claim  - Credits  +  Patloipatioens  +  Sends  +  Other
(a)  Stocks  expressd  as  goioetule  averages.
(b):  lId  of  Year.
(a)  ad of  yea  stodks  4eflated  by  WI  COecember) is
IM, XIS  Supplement  of  Pleo  Statisticso  1964.- 39  -
Table  6: Private  Sector's  share  in  total  Credit
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984
Total  Credit/GNP  47.5 40.8  36.7  29.9  31.4  30.5  29.7  23.1
Share  of Private  Sector
Credit  in  Total  50.7  50.9  49.8 52.0  59.8  65.1  68.2  74.8
Share  of Private  Sector
in  new  Credit  39.4  51.7  47.6  55.3  73.9  83.3  79.2  102.5
Source:  Central  Bank,  Quarterly  Bulletin.
Table  7:  Annual  Non-Weighted  Averages  of Financial  Ratios
1979  1980  1981  19R2  1983  1984
Profitability  0.424  0.240  -0.046  0.185  0.358
Gross  Margin  0.233  0.262  0.223  0.193  0.183  0.218
EBIT  0.172  0.179  0.171  0.142  0.131  0.172
Asset  Utilization  1.525  1.440  1.513  1.549  1.846
Average  Financial  Costs  0.132  0.154  0.183  0.168  0.189
Gearing  Ratio  0.686  0.703  0.727  0.682  0.626
Source:  CMB  data  set.- 40 -
Table 8: Regression Results
Dep. Var.: Profitability (PR)
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984
BY  -- 0.033  -0.123  -0.125  -0.027
BL  -0.678*  -0.832*  -1.698*  -0.907*  -0.815*
F-test  P1: 1.000  P2: 0.815  P3: 0.000  P4: 0.004
Dep. Var.: Gross Margin (GM)
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984
BY  0.019  -0.016  -0.069*  -0.047*  -0.015
EL  -0.161*  -0.090*  -0.088*  -0.125*  -0.159 * -0.055
F-test  P1: 0.000  P2: 0.000  P3: 0.000  P4: 0.123
Dep. Var.: EBIT Margin (EBIT)
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984
By  0.015  0.002  -0.004  -0.030  -0.010
BL  -0.266*  -0.172*  -0.108*  -0.195*  -0.204*  -0.019
F-test  P1: 0.000  P2: 0.330  P3: 0.000  P4: 0.000
Dep. Var.: Asset Utilization (AU)
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984
By  -0.018  0.002  -0.040  0.141**
BL  -0.441*  -0.456*  -0.293*  -0.107  -0.015
F-test  P1: 0.000  P2: 0.166  P3: 0.000  P4: 0.069
Dep. Var.: Average Financial Cost (FC)
-- 1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984
By  0.029*  0.046*  0.037*  0.063*
BL  0.022  -0.017  0.034  0.022***  -0.028
F-test  P1: 0.000  P2: 0.000  P3: 0.134  P4: 0.100
Dep. Var.: Gearing Ratio (GR)
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984
BY  0.015  0.017  -0.010  -0.028
BL  0.064*** 0.054**  0.159*  0.116*  0.147*
F-test  P1: 0.000  P2: 0.119  P3: 0.000  P4: 0.012
(*) significant at 1 % level; (**)  significant at 5% level; (***)
significant at 10 % level.-41  -
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